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Abstract
This document lays out the specifications for a componentised DRM system. Requirements for a gen-
eral DRM system are discussed, and we detail a set of components that address these requirements.
This document also details the specific services that should be offered by each component and specifies
the communication protocols and contents of these messages.
Each of the components of the DRM system are fully fledged web services, and thus some of these
components can be used in areas other than DRM. Furthermore, we envisage existing services, such
as Certificate Authorities, easily fitting into our proposed framework.
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1 Introduction
Digital Rights Management (DRM) is a relatively new field in Computer Science. The aim of DRM
is to create a mechanism of persistent access control [24]. This means that regardless of where data
protected with DRM resides, users of the data will have to abide by the access control mechanisms
placed on the data or not be able to access the data all. This is different from encrypted data in that
there is no control on what a legitimate user does with the data once he/she has unencrypted the
data. While the current focus of DRM is to solve the problems associated with piracy of media (esp
music), DRM can also be used to protect any type of sensitive data like health records.
In [20], Park et al. described three ways of distinguishing various access control mechanisms for data.
In the first level, there is a “virtual machine” or a “DRM controller” as described by Rosenblatt et
al. [23] that enforces the access control rules for the DRM work. In the second level are the various
mechanisms to define the access control rules or “control sets”. Control sets can be fixed to the DRM
controller, embedded with the protected data or come as a separate “use license”. Finally the authors
distinguished between the actual distribution mechanism of the data. In [10], Bartolini et al. discussed
the various roles and players in an “Electronic Copyright Management System”. We use these roles
and players as a base for most of the components in our DRM system.
In [24], Rosenblatt et al. also discussed a wider definition of DRM as “everything that can be done
to define, manage and track rights to digital content”. Under this definition, technologies such as
watermarking and fingerprinting can also be considered as part of a DRM solution.
In these specifications, we aim to define a set of components and related data formats for the cre-
ation, administration and distribution of DRM protected data. The primary aim of the system is to
achieve persistent protection, but the system will also allow for components that allow for additional
technologies such as watermarking and fingerprinting. We will also define the control set formats and
mechanisms as well as the interface between the DRM controller and the rest of the system. The
enforcement of DRM will need to differ in different platforms and operating systems and thus we will
not define the specifics of how a DRM controller should be implemented. However, we will define the
requirements of the DRM controller.
1.1 Motivation
DRM can potentially be used for a variety of uses but the core requirements remain the same. For
example, DRM can be used by individuals to protect personal information and data (financial details,
love letters etc), by enterprises to protect data (from trade secrets to market plans to office memos
about the christmas party) as well as the current use of DRM – a means to control the usage of widely
distributed intellectual property.
Regardless of the use, DRM must also allow for the enforcement of the legal rights of all the parties
involved. However, the legal rights do depend on the circumstances of use. For example, if the
protected data happens to be the design documents of a company’s new product, the company is
rightfully expected to track very carefully the users who have access to the document as well as when
and where they access the informations. However if the data is a pop song being sold to the public,
the public has an expectation (and in most countries a right) not to be monitored where, when and
how the listen to the song.
For the above reason, there can be an argument that DRM systems for enterprises and consumers need
be separate. However separate systems also end up creating duplications – the underlying protection
mechanism needs to be the same and the cryptographic fundamentals are the same. Thus, users would
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end up needing multiple identities, multiple key pairs and multiple mechanisms to enforce DRM.
The aim of the specifications is to provide a system that is general enough but at the same time
allows flexibility for any type of use. Thus, one DRM system would allow the users to access protected
documents for their work as well as buy and listen to music while they work.
1.2 Requirements
In this section, we list the requirements of a general DRM system. Specialised DRM systems like
enterprises DRM systems could have additional requirements to the ones detailed below.Many of
these requirements have been presented before by Bartolini et al. [10], Park et al. [20] and Mulligan
et al. [19]. We have also presented some of these requirements in a previous paper [7].
1. Persistent protection: A DRM system must guarantee persistent protection of the secured
objects. This means that regardless of the location of the digital data 1, the access controls
that are imposed by the rights holder must either be enforced or the device should not be
able to read the file at all. If persistent failure is not achieved, the system can be considered
a failure.
2. Portability: Portability can have a number of different meanings, and not all aspects of porta-
bility are equally important. We have divided portability into four types, and discuss them
in increasing importance:
(a) Time Shifting: Time shifting refers to the ability of the user to access the work when
he or she wants to. While the freedom is critical in the consumer space, this is not
the same in an enterprise. In fact, it could be the case that an access to protected
data in “odd” hours is indicative of misuse. Time shifting is conceptually easy to
declare and implement, but time is measured by different means (is device’s clock
using GMT or local time) and proper synchronisation is required.
(b) Space Shifting: Space shifting refers to the ability of the user to freely access the
work in whichever device he or she wants. In most cases, enterprises would like
to restrict the number of devices that can access protected data while consumers
would like to use any of the devices they own.
(c) Format Shifting: Referring to online music and video stores, Mulligan et al. argued
that format shifting is also an important portability issue [19]. Format shifting
allows the user to change the format of the data file (without necessarily affecting
the access control rules). Format shifting could be important in an enterprise for
a variety of reasons – for example, the enterprise could keep internal data stored
in a certain format and in a different format when released to other companies or
even to the public (in the case of financial statements for example). Similarly in
the consumer space, format shifting is also important to consumers – for example,
format shifting would allow users to write audio CDs from digital music down-
loads. Format shifting should also allow for easier integration between different
applications across different platforms.
(d) Platform Shifting: Platform shifting refers to the ability of the user to use different
operating systems and devices to access the protected data. In an enterprise, this
is probably the most important requirement. Even small businesses are likely to
make use of a multitude of different devices – PDA’s, desktop computers, laptops
1This only applies to the digital format of the data. For example, for an electronic text file, the controls must apply
to the text and not to the paper copy if the text can be printed. This is an important distinction, as there will always
be analogue bypasses to DRM – for example taking photos with a camera when a screenshot is not allowed.
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and servers. Even if an enterprise decides to make use of one vendor for all their
devices (e.g. Linux or Microsoft), the devices are likely to run different versions of
the operating system and applications and thus portability is extremely important.
In the consumer space, platform shifting is also important, and while mobility be-
tween a PDA and a computer may not be important, other devices are. Many
mobile telephones already allow for music playback and home entertainment sys-
tems allow for the convergence of digital media to the living room. Thus, seamless
platform mobility may become even more important than in enterprise DRM sys-
tems.
3. Integration with existing applications: This requirement could also be another portability
requirement – the ability of using different applications to access protected data. Currently
all DRM systems require specialised applications to handle protected data – but a DRM
system that is application independent is ideal. Off course this would depend on whether
the application itself supports the data file format (for example, Microsoft Word does not
support Open Office file formats).
4. Excerpting: Excerption allows a user to take a certain segment of data from one source for
inclusion in another data file. Excerpting can range from a simple “copy and paste” to com-
plex uses such as mixing multiple audio and video streams to form a new creative work.
Fair use clauses in most copyright laws allow for excerption under certain circumstances.
Excerption is also useful in an enterprise to allow different data sources to be merged to be
presented in one document for example.
There are two major problems in dealing with excerption. Firstly, as discussed in [19],
applications that are used to render the protected data are usually unsuitable for compli-
cated excerption tasks. At the current moment, only specific applications can access DRM
protected data thus not allowing excerpting. Secondly, it is difficult to control how much of
a protected document can be be excerpted. For example, fair use allows the use of a video
clip for the purpose of review (use of a trailer to review a movie for instance). However,
the reviewer cannot take the entire work and use it as part of the review. The first part of
the problem is part of the portability issue, and we do address it in the specification. The
second part is a more complicated issue and is not addressed.
5. Transfer of Rights: The ability to transfer rights of usage is very important in both the con-
sumer space and enterprise DRM systems. Transfer of rights would allow a user to lend a
work to friend or family member. However transfer of rights does need to be controlled in
two respects:
(a) In these specifications we position DRM to be used for general protection of data and
not only for music and e-books. Transfer of rights for confidential data need to be
controlled by an authorised entity.
(b) Because of the ease of replication of digital data, transfer of rights also means that the
work should not be accessible after the right has been transfered. For example, if a
user sells his right to listen to a music file, his use license should expire and remain
invalid until he purchases the right again.
The revocation of rights also falls under transfer of rights.
6. Allow for changes to access and usage rights after distribution: The initial rights as-
signed to a user might not be enough (because they are too restrictive for example) or
maybe more than necessary (because the employee was re-assigned to a different depart-
ment in a enterprise DRM deployment for example). This requirement does allow indirectly
for the expression of fair uses, although in a more regulated and constricted environment.
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7. Privacy vs. Usage Tracking: In the consumer space, users expect limited interaction with
the rights holders after purchase [19]. User privacy is thus very important and many gov-
ernments have laws governing the protection of user privacy. User privacy includes the
protection of personal data collected from the user as well as not monitoring the usage
of DRM enabled works by the right holder. Privacy becomes important in a distributed
service environment as different services should not be able to access data that they are not
entitled to. However, monitoring of usage does not necessarily extend in a corporate envi-
ronment. For confidential data, a corporation would probably retain the right to monitor
the usage of the data, and should confidential data be leaked, the source of the leak should
be easily identifiable.
Privacy and usage tracking are mutually exclusive – an increase usage tracking leads to a
lower user privacy and vice versa.
8. Oﬄine Usage: Communication networks are not perfect, and there are many situations where
users may not have access to the Internet (for example using a laptop on a aeroplane). Also,
some consumer electronic products (such as music players like iPods) do not have Internet
access. Thus oﬄine usage is desirable; but does have its drawbacks for rights holders –
oﬄine usage reduces monitoring and tracking capabilities. For example, in an enterprise
DRM deployment, if an employee is fired and the employee has protected data that can be
accessed oﬄine, the employee could still retain access to the protected data.
9. Easy identification: In [10], the authors identified the identification of digital works as a
crucial component of a DRM system. A DRM system must be able to uniquely identify
digital works on the Internet, and have a mechanism to correctly associate the users that
have rights to use/access the work as well as mechanisms to associate the right holders of
the work.
10. Easy Verification: Another criteria given by Bartolini et al. is to allow honest users to easily
prove that they have legitimate access to the protected work [10]. This extends in general
to all objects and transactions in a DRM system; integrity and verification should be easy
to proove.
11. Correctly collect revenue for right holders: Should an end user require to pay for the right
to use a work, the DRM system must be able to collect the correct amount, and record
the transaction such that the correct right holders are compensated appropriately. This
requirement is mainly for the consumer space.
In [9] we looked at some of the security considerations for a DRM system. A DRM system must
address the 5 services identified in ITU’s X.800 specifications. These services are:
1. Authentication: The process of verifying an identity claimed by or for a system entity [25].
2. Access Control: Protection of system resources against unauthorized access [25]
3. Data Confidentiality: Service that protects data against unauthorized disclosure [25].
4. Data Integrity: Protects against unauthorized changes to data, including both intentional
change or destruction and accidental change or loss, by ensuring that changes to data are
detectable [25]
5. Non-Repudiation: Provide protection against false denial of involvement in a communica-
tion [25].
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Availability is not explicitly stated in X.800 but many consider it as another essential security
service [27].
6. Availability: A system or a system resource being accessible and usable upon demand by an
authorized system entity, according to performance specifications for the system [25].
In our view, the ideal DRM system must be able to cater for all the above requirements.
1.3 Layout
Before we detail the specifications however, in section 2 we detail three scenarios where we see the
possible use of DRM. Following the scenarios, we detail the overall system architecture as well as an
overview of the communication and security architecture in section 3. Following these two chapters,
the specific modules of the architecture are detailed.
The layout of the specifications is as follows: In section 4, we detail the PKI infrastructure used in
the DRM system. Following that, in section 6 we discuss identity management in the DRM system
as well as service details of the UNI.
1.4 Glossary of Terms
Use License: A set of terms and conditions, like a contract, that allow a user to access and use a
DRM enabled work.
User: The user is a person or entity making use of the DRM system to create or access DRM protected
work. It could be a human, a computer program or legal persons such as companies.
5
2 Scenarios
In this section, we present three scenarios intended to capture the variety of uses of DRM as a security
mechanism. In the first scenario, we demonstrate the use of DRM in a scenario where 2 or more
different organisations need to share access to the data. In the second scenario, we examine the case
of the traditional DRM use – protecting copyrighted material. In the last scenario, we discuss the use
of DRM totally within a single organisation. Following the description of the scenarios, in section 2.4
we present a summary of the important requirements linking back to the requirements set out in
section 1.2.
2.1 Scenario A: Exam Papers
Carl is the teaching assistant for the 3rd year undergraduate Computer Science course. One of his
duties is to typeset the final exam. This process involves collecting the questions from the various
lecturers of the course (including a part time lecturer who works for an IT company in the city). After
typesetting, the paper is then sent to all the relevant lecturers for comments. The lecturers email the
comments back to Carl, who then makes the relevant changes and emails the final exam to the eternal
examiner. All communication between Carl and the lecturers take place via e-mail. After the exam
has been set, it is sent to the printers for printing.
Traditional encryption is not a full solution to the problem. Ideally, Carl should be the only person
with rights to modify the exam. The printers should only have rights to reading and printing the
exam and never write and modify permissions. Traditional access control mechanisms such as active
directory are also unsuitable – external examiners and printers will not have access, while a part time
lecturer would probably like to use a personal machine not connected to the university network.
The integrity of a degree requires that the exam questions are not leaked. Thus confidentiality is of
highest importance. Tracing the source of a leak, if there is one, is also important, and thus tracking
usage of the exam is also important. Portability between platforms is also important as the lecturers,
Carl, the external marker and the printers could be using different platforms.
2.2 Scenario B: Selling Music
Eric, James and Oswald play in a band, but are not affiliated with any music label. They have
produced an album which they would like to sell online through their website. Other local bands that
Eric and co have played with have also expressed interest in such a venture and thus Eric would like
to set up an online music store for all the bands. Eric eventually hopes that other bands will sign up
with the idea, and use the music store to sell their music.
Eric would like the music store to have similar restrictions as the iTunes music store, except allow
people more freedom on where they can listen to the music they buy, as well as sell and lend the music
to their friends. They would also like to ensure their fans’ privacy and not track the usage of their
music files. The bands would like certain permissions, like the ability to excerpt, to be granted on a
request basis.
2.3 Scenario C: Patient Data in a Hospital Group
Netcare 2 is a large private hospital group operating a number of hospitals, clinics and medical centres
across the country. For the convenience of their clients, patient data (personal data, medical history
2Netcare is a real private hospital group in South Africa. This example is for illustrative purposes only and the
example does not have any correlation with the operations of the Netcare group.
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etc) is accessible from any hospital, clinic or medical centre. Thus, should a patient be checked into
hospital for any reason, the full patient data set is available to the attending doctors and nurses. Data
can also be updated across the system, allowing full tracking of medical history for the patient.
This however has a counter problem – the patient data can be accessed by any nurse, doctor or even
administrator who has access to the system. This is a major privacy problem, as a patient would
expect their medical data to be available to only the doctors involved with the treatment. Thus the
system poses a dual challenge - making data available to doctors when needed but at the same time
restricting the use of the data. It is also a case where DRM can be used to protect the privacy, which
is contrary to many claims about DRM [4, 6].
This scenario can be solved to a certain extent using technologies such as LDAP and similar directory
services. However this would also mean that, ultimately the administrators of the systems would have
unlimited access to the private data, which is still a privacy risk. Ideally however, you would like the
patient’s personal doctor, if not the patient him(her)self controlling access to the data. However, safe
guards do need to be taken in certain scenarios where the patient is not capable of granting access and
his/her doctor is unavailable (for example a car accident and the personal doctor is away on holiday).
2.4 Requirement Analysis
In the following table, we examine which of the requirements set out in section 2.4 apply to the scenarios
above. A Y represents a definite requirement while a N represents a definite non requirement. A
M represent a requirement that would be nice to have but is not crucial. In the case of Privacy v.s.
Tracking, a P represents a case where user privacy requirements override tracking requirements, while
a T represents the case where user privacy is not a concern as much as tracking the data.
Requirements Scenario A Scenario B Scenario C
01 Persistent Protection Y Y Y
02 Portability: Time Shifting Y Y Y
03 Portability: Space Shifting Y Y M
04 Portability: Format Shifting Y Y M
05 Portability: Platform Shifting Y Y Y
06 Integration with existing applications Y Y Y
07 Excerpting N Y M
08 Transfer of Rights N Y Y
09 Allow for changes to access and usage rights af-
ter distribution
Y Y Y
10 Privacy vs. Usage Tracking T P T
11 Oﬄine Usage Y Y Y
12 Easy identification Y Y Y
13 Easy verification Y Y Y
14 Collection of revenue N Y N
Table 1: Requirement analysis of the three scenarios
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3 System Architecture
In this section we give an overview of the entire system, an overview of the communications architecture
and discuss where various security services detailed in section 1.2 are handled.
3.1 Components of the DRM System
In Figure 1, we give the overall architecture of the DRM system. Each of the components are derived
from a set of roles described by Bartolini et al. in [10]. In this systems architecture, we do not
detail how each of the components communicate, and instead we give our proposed communications
architecture in section 3.4.
Figure 1: Architecture of the Componentized DRM System (shaded components are optional)
In [7] we noted that the roles described by Bartolini et al. did not have a role defined for the end user.
Bartolini et al. did however, cater for the creators and the right holders of the DRM work. In our
architecture, we consolidate them into one – as the users of the DRM system. We also add a Payment
Gateway (P.G.) module, which is not considered as a role in [10]. While authentication and credential
services are implied requirements in [10], they did not appear as firm roles in the system. In our system
these services are optional, as there are other mechanisms to implement these functions. We would also
like to separate our proposed components into required and optional (which are shaded in figure 1);
with the Authentication Service, Credentials Service, Payment Gateway (P.G.), the Controller and
the Distributor being optional roles.
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1. Trust Service(Required): The trust service is the main trusted third party (TTP) that is
trusted by all the involved parties. At the moment, the trust service would be a certificate
authority (CA) who will be involved in certifying public keys of the participants. Simi-
lar trust services could also be involved in system such as the TPM manufacturers in the
trusted computing initiative [12]. The role of PKI is discussed in more detail in section 4.
Involved in addressing requirements: Oﬄine Usage, Easy Verification
2. UNI (Required): The Unique Number Issuer (UNI) will be responsible for managing identity
for users, services and every DRM enabled work. The identifiers should be globally unique,
and as such one UNI should be able to serve a number of service producers. The UNI is
based on the handle service and is discussed in more detail in section 6.
Involved in addressing requirements: Easy Identification
3. Service Producer (Required): The service producer packages the work in a security envelope,
together with the unique identifier from the UNI and creates a template for the rights that
can be granted to an end user. The service producer and the author roles can be the same;
but there could be situations where a separate service producer is desired (e.g. the rights
holder of the work is not the same as the author).
Involved in addressing requirements: Persistent Protection, Format Shifting, Platform
Shifting
4. License Server (Required): The license server serves two functions in our framework. Firstly,
the license server hands out use licenses to the end user. The use licenses specify the rights
that the user has on a DRM protected work. Should it be required, the license server can
make use of the Payment Gateway for the end user to pay for the rights.
The second function of the license server is to handle requests from users for additional
rights. Some of these requests could be granted automatically (for free or for a price) which
can be predetermined by the rights holder. The rights holder could also setup a set of
requests to deny automatically. Otherwise the license server should communicate with the
rights holder the requests from the end user; and the rights holder can then communicate
back with the license server granting or denying the request. The use of a request system
should allow for a work around for fair use; which is difficult to express in a REL.
Involved in addressing requirements: Transfer of Rights, Allow for changes to access
and usage rights after distribution
5. User (Required): The user can be either the creator of a DRM work or be the end user. As
an author, the user uses the service producer to create a DRM protected work. The user
can then make use of a distributor or can distribute the work on his/her own. The author
will also require a mechanism to receive requests from end users (forwarded by the license
server) and respond to these requests. As an end user, the user retrieves use licenses from
the license server and then can use the DRM protected work as defined by the license. The
user component is responsible for the enforcement of the terms and conditions laid out in
the use license.
Involved in addressing requirements: Persistent Protection, Time Shifting, Space
Shifting, Platform Shifting, Format Shifting, Integration with existing applications, Ex-
cerpting, Oﬄine Usage
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6. Authentication Service (Optional): Authentication of users and services can be handled in
a variety of ways and is discussed in more detail in section 10.
Involved in addressing requirements: Privacy vs. Usage Tracking, Easy Verification,
Oﬄine Usage
7. Credentials Service(Optional): Authentication gives proof that a user is who he or she claims
they are. Credentials is aimed at access control – is the user allowed to access a service
once they are authenticated. However, our use of credentials for users is slightly different,
and is geared more towards enabling fair use. The credential authority and its functions is
discussed in more detail in section 11.
Involved in addressing requirements: Allow for changes to access and usage rights
after distribution, Transfer of Rights
8. Distributor (Optional): A DRM protected work is required to have persistent protection re-
gardless of where the work resides. For this reason, the distributor is not a requirement
for the system, as DRM protection must work if the work is transferred over peer-to-peer
networks, made available for download on the Internet etc. However the distributor does
provide some interesting possibilities for DRM enabled work distribution.
The main use of a distributor is in an electronic store; as demonstrated in the Apple iTunes
Music Store. In the Apple iTunes Store, the music file is encrypted using the end user’s
public key and thus only the end user is supposed to be able to decrypt the file. Similarly,
the use of a distributor allows for the possibility of personalising the DRM enabled work
for every user. In this case, the Distributor would need to make use of the Service Provider
for every “sale” of the DRM enabled work.
Without the use of a distributor, a shared key is required. In this scenario, the use license
of the work would specify the shared key to decrypt the DRM package. This solution is
most useful in an intra-enterprise deployment.
Involved in addressing requirements: Persistent Protection, Correctly collect revenue
for right holders
9. Payment Gateway (Optional): Like the Distributor, the Payment Gateway is an optional
component. The Payment Gateway is only required where the framework is used for deliv-
ering commercial products, such as an online store.
Involved in addressing requirements: Correctly collect revenue for right holders
10. Controller (Optional): In [10] Bartolini et al. put the Controller as a very important com-
ponent of a DRM system. While the controller plays a very important role in commercial
DRM systems (co-incidentally none of the current DRM system deployments use a con-
troller), its use in an intra-enterprise scenario is not that important. For this reason, we
have decided to cater for the Controller as an optional component in our framework. The
use of a controller does increase the overall overhead and this could be a major factor
against the use of a controller.
Involved in addressing requirements: Easy verification
11. Logging (Configurable): While the use of a controller is optional, the use of logs in a DRM
system is of great importance. However the use of logs has its drawback. If used excessively,
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logs can be used to monitor the usage of DRM enabled work by end users. For this reason
our framework must strike a balance between what actions should be logged (issue of a
license, revocation of a license) and what should not be logged.
Involved in addressing requirements: Privacy vs. Usage Tracking
3.2 Requirement Analysis Summary
Table 2 gives a summary of which components are involved in addressing a particular requirement, as
discussed in section 3.1.
Requirements Components/Role
01 Persistent Protection Service Producer, User, Distributor
02 Portability: Time Shifting User
03 Portability: Space Shifting User
04 Portability: Format Shifting Service Producer, User
05 Portability: Platform Shifting Service Producer, User
06 Integration with existing applications User
07 Excerpting User
08 Transfer of Rights License Server, Credentials Service
09 Allow for changes to access and usage rights af-
ter distribution
License Server, Credentials Service
10 Privacy vs. Usage Tracking Authentication Service, Logging
11 Oﬄine Usage Trust Service, User, Authentication Service
12 Easy identification UNI,
13 Easy verification Trust Service, Authentication Service, Con-
troller
14 Collection of revenue Distributor, Payment Gateway
Table 2: Summary of components that address a particular requirement
3.3 Scenario Analysis
Components Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
01 Trust Service Y Y Y
02 UNI Y Y Y
03 Service Producer Y Y Y
04 License Server Y Y Y
05 User Y Y Y
06 Authentication Service M M Y
07 Credentials Service N M Y
08 Distributor N Y M
09 Payment Gateway N Y N
10 Controller M Y Y
11 Logging Medium Low High
Table 3: Scenario Analysis of the components
Table 3 examines the components required to address the scenarios discussed in section 2. A Y
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represents a component that is definitely required, aM represents a component that could be used to
provide additional functionality but could be left out while a N represents a component that is not
needed to solve the problems posed by the scenario. The values in row 11 addressing logging, looks
at the degree of logging that is needed by the scenario.
3.4 Communication Architecture
We suggest that each of the components be developed as standalone Web Services, and use SOAP
as the communication protocol. At the moment, SOAP does not offer any security services, but it
is hoped that WS-Security proposals will be standardised. As standalone Web Services, each module
can also be used for other functionalities that are not necessarily DRM related. For example, if the
trust service is a certificate authority, it can also be used to certify any certificate and not just for
DRM systems.
Thus, each module is effectively a service and the framework can then follow a Service Oriented
Architecture (SOA). The service provider and service requestor in our framework will be the respective
modules. A service description module is not included in our architecture as it is not specific to the
system. However, a service such as service description was regarded as a neccessity by Bartolini et al.
in [10].
3.4.1 Use of SOAP
SOAP is a communication protocol standard designed to allow two Web Services to communicate
regardless of the platform on which the Web Service is running. SOAP does not provide any security
advatages, but does allow for the use of an established, multi platform, language independent com-
munication protocol. We thus strongly recomend the use of SOAP for communication between the
services.
The payload is carried in a SOAP envelope, and two security services, non-repudiation and data
integrity, can be handled at the payload level. Each Web Service in the framework has an associated
XML schema to describe the payload for the communication. A root element of each schema3 is the
SignedCommUnit element. Figure 2 shows an example of one such element.
This element encapsulates the data required (contents) for communication with the service, and then
attaches a XML digital signature. The digital signature must sign the contents, and thus offers non-
repudiation (only the owner of the private key can sign the contents) and data integrity (a feature of
digital signatures themselves).
3.5 Security Architecture
Our framework must cater for the security services identified in 1.2. Of the 6 services identified,
Authentication and Access Control need to be addressed in finer detail at the individual service levels.
3.5.1 XML Security
Web Services make extensive use of XML for communication because XML files are portable across
different system types. Use licenses also make use of XML for the same reason. In our system, we
also allow for the DRM data package to be stored as a XML file.
The system makes extensive use of two major XML Security recommendations – XML Digital Signa-
3Most schemas have more than one root element – one root element handles communication, while other root elements
handle any data produced by the service.
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Figure 2: XML schema for SignedCommUnit element for the UNI service (See chapter 6)
ture (XML-DSIG) [29] and XML Encryption (XML-ENC) [28]. Both specifications allow part of a (or
an entire) XML file to be signed or encrypted respectively.
3.5.2 Authentication and Access Control
Authentication can be handled separately by individual services, and if this is the case, they should
make use of the XML-Security extensions to SOAP [?] for communication. However, authentication
can also be provided by an external service, like through the use of a federated identity management
system. Similarly, access control can be be implemented by individual services or through the use of
a credentials service.
3.5.3 Data Confidentiality
As discussed in [9], data confidentiality has to be addressed at two levels:
1. during communication between services
2. during processing or storage by a service
In most respects, secure communication is a “solved” problem on the Internet. Internet commerce can
only take place with the presence of secure communication through the use of SSL sessions between
the web server and the client.
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We propose the same – all communication between various Web Services must take place in SSL
sessions. This will ensure data confidentiality during communication.
If data needs to be protected in a DRM enabled form, then the storage should be in the DRM package
itself. This applies to services like the distribution service. However there is other data that would
need to be stored securely in a database (such as identifers) and maybe user data. Although database
files themselves can be secured using DRM, weak access controls on the database are more likely to be
the source of security breaches. Thus strong access control to the databases and isolating the database
behind a firewall etc. are good steps towards securing the database.
Secure processing is another concern as confidential data can be in an unencrypted form during
processing, and lead to a breach in confidentiality. This may not be a problem in the services dealing
with the production of DRM protected data, but is of high important in the virtual machines of the
end users that render the data in an usable form. The first hack of Apple’s iTunes music service
managed to grab the unencrypted copy of the music file from memory while the song was being played
with iTunes for Windows application. Such a breach is more due to programmer error, but should be
kept in mind. Trusted computing also aims to address the problem through the use of trusted devices
which can handle encrypted data on the devices themselves.
3.5.4 Data Integrity & Non-Repudiation
As mentioned in section 3.4.1, each message from a service is signed using the service’s private key.
Digital signatures provide both data integrity and non-repudiation services. Should the communication
protocol be changed from SOAP to another protocol (like using a traditional RPC mechanism), the
security services offered by the payload is not affected.
3.5.5 Availability
Availability is a difficult requirement to address in the case of a denial of service (dos) attacks. However
in a componentized system, with multiple components that serving a single function, the effects of a
dos attacks can be reduced. Furthermore, to take down the complete system; every component needs
to be unavailable, which is less likely to occur than the case of a single monolith system.
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4 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
Public Key Cryptography will be used extensively in the DRM system. To allow for different compo-
nents to talk to each other they must make use of a common PKI system. For that there needs to be
a common certificate system, and there are three such systems available currently:
1. X.509
2. SPKI/SDSI
3. PGP
4.1 PKI Systems
4.1.1 X.509
Currently the most popular PKI system used [27], and is well entrenched in many web based services.
The main drawback of a X.509 is the number of different extensions available for version 3. However
the extensions are not really required in the system; and any version 2 certificate should be able to do
the required job.
4.1.2 SPKI/SDSI
The Simple Public Key Infrastructure (SPKI) was set up by The Internet Engineering Task Force
(IETF) “to address the overcomplications in the X.509 world” [15]. SPKI certificate structure was
designed from scratch; and instead of designing on the premise that the identity of a person implies
the authorisation for an action as in X.509, SPKI rather uses the idea of the user of a particular
certificate has the authorisation for an action. There can then be a separate mapping between a user
and the certificate.
This abstraction is very useful for a DRM system. In the consumer space, current DRM systems
potentially allow for the monitoring of users through their use of the DRM protected work. By
moving the authorisation to a certificate level, this is removed. As long as the publishers cannot make
an association between the certificate and the actual user - there is a reduced privacy concern4.
4.1.3 PGP
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) is already well entrenched as a PKI infrastructure for secure email [27].
PGP’s open source nature and the “web of trust” certification mechanims also makes it attractive to
end users since the hierarchichal certification mechanism of X.509 certificates can be quite expensive.
Similar to the SPKI specifications, PGP is more lightweight when compared to X.509. It can also be
used in an anonymous scenario although it is recomended to use an email address as part of the user
id field in the certificate for identifying a PGP certificate [26].
There are potentially two problems with PGP. Firstly, certain businesses could be reluctant to rely on
the web of trust mechanism. For example, in a web of trust mechanism, it is possible that the user and
a service do not have a common trust partner. This scenario will not occur with a set of certificate
4Privacy concern is not removed as the publisher can still potentially monitor the use - but this becomes more at a
superficial level. Now the publisher cannot make associations between the age group of their consumers and consumer’s
product preferences for example
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authorities common to the system. The second potential problem could be the user id’s defined in the
PGP certificate format. Since there is no specific format it is not guaranteed to be unique between
two users (for example if two users called John Smith both use their names only and not their email
addresses).
4.2 Usage in DRM system
We are leaning towards the use of PGP as the main PKI system. PGP is already well entrenched for
use in secure email [26]. PGP is very user centric and actively promotes user privacy. The problem of
trust can be solved by using a CA as one of the main trusted parties. Using the email address only as
the identifier for the certificate, the CA can sign the certificate and return it via email. This will get
round the second problem posed above.
For the sake of flexibilty, any of the three systems should be usable. However, for the sake of compata-
bility all components must implement PGP system. Thus any components can communicate using
PGP, but should two components prefer a different mechanism and they both support that mechanism,
they should be able to use it. The certificate should be a standard PGP certicate with the identifier
as only the user’s email address. Before it can be used however, it must be certified by a CA trusted
by the DRM system.
4.3 The Trust Service
Currently, certificate authorities are the only examples of a trust service available. As a CA, the
service can sign public key certificates of users and other services. A CA can fit within a web of trust,
by simply becoming a member of the the web of trust. In this manner, a PGP certificate can be used
in both hierarchichal trust environments and its traditional web of trust environment. The CA should
also sign device identifier tokens (see Chapter 10.3.4).
Manufacturers of TPM modules can also be seen as providers of a trust service. TPMs are discussed
in more detail in section 10.4.
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5 The Controller
Trust is a major factor in any transaction. DRM systems have to take this into account, especially
when serving the public. The consumer expects that the service provider will not abuse any data that
they collect, nor make any illegal side transactions. For example, the DRM system should not monitor
the usage of the DRM enabled media unless the consumer agreed to such monitoring. Similarly, the
service provider trusts the consumer not to break the DRM protection. Trust does not need to be
absolute but there needs to be a mechanism to measure the degree of trust. In [17], the authors
discussed setting the security level of a DRM package based on the consumer’s trustworthiness. In
our system, the controller is a TTP that can independently measure the trustworthiness of any other
participant in the system.
The idea of a controller was first raised in [10] by Bartolini et al. who defined the controller as “a
Trusted Third Party (TTP) responsible for monitoring all transactions have been carried out legally.”.
Bartolini et al. felt that the establishment of TTPs such as the controller and certificate authorities
will have a large role in the success of a DRM system. The implementation of a controller as described
by Bartolini et al. however implies a big overhead in network routing and traffic cost. The presence of
a controller also raises the issue of privacy, as to monitor the legality of a transaction, the controller
would also require to know all the details of the transaction.
However as discussed earlier, the controller has the ability to provide an independent trust valuation
for all the parties in a DRM system. Thus instead of a per-transaction monitoring system, it would
be better to describe the controller as an auditing system. The controller should be able to audit a
component to verify that the component caries out its tasks legally, and implements the requirements
of the component correctly. Thus it can audit the service producer on how well they protect consumer
data, and can audit the consumer on how well the DRM controller protects the rights holders. This
is important, even in open source implementations, as the implementation can differ from the original
project.
Figure 3: XML schema of a Controller Certificate
Thus the role of a controller is to audit a component, and certify that the component carries out all
its tasks legally and maybe give a score on how trustworthy a system is. To certify a component,
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a digital signature of the binaries can be taken (individually if there are more than one binary) and
any changes to a binary would require a re-certification. The controller then issues a certificate,
which can be reviewed by any other party if they wish to. Figure 3 shows the XML schema of a
controller certificate which can handle multiple binaries. It is not our intention to show how trust
can be measured in a DRM system, but rather to provide a mechanism to describe the result of the
measurement.
However, certification of a set of binaries does not imply that the component is using the certified
binaries. This is an open problem and open to further research.
5.1 Scenario Analysis
In table 3 (section 3.1), we indicated that the controller is required only in scenarios 2 and 3 and while
it can be used in scenario 1, it is not really required.
For scenario 2, the controller provides the rights holders a measure how much they can trust the
consumer. Similarly, the consumer can gauge the trustworthiness of the music service and whether the
consumers are safe in revealing any personal information (like a credit card number while purchasing
music) to the service providers.
For scenario 3, the stakeholders in the trustworthiness of the system are not only the consumers and
the hospital, but also the government. In many countries, there are laws that protect patients on
how their medical data is used. The controller can be used to express the results of an audit of
the computer system of the hospital group. This can be used to re-assure both patients and other
interested stakeholders.
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6 Identity and the UNI Service
6.1 Introduction
Every digital object needs a globally unique identifier if they are to exist on the Internet. Globally
unique identifiers usually compose of a protocol identifier (eg. http), followed by a server or a host,
followed by the actual identifier of the object.
The Unique Number Issuer (UNI) is the component responsible for issuing unique identifiers to to all
parties and objects involved in a DRM transaction, and is one of the core components of the system.
Because of the number of parties and digital objects involved in a DRM system, we have decided
to divide them into different categories to allow for easier administration, and further classes can be
added if required. In our system, all copies of the same digital object have the same identifier. The
identifier (discussed in more detail in section 6.2) also has versioning support allowing two versions
of a data file to have similar identifiers (and thus also allow use licenses to specify what versions the
license applies to).
At the moment, our categories are:
Data: Data that is being protected by DRM need to be uniquely identifiable. The use licenses granted
by the license servers need to match the data they provide access to. Different versions of data
must have different identifiers. Details on versioning is detailed in the next subsection.
Licenses: Licenses used in the system should be identifiable (e.g. serial number) for auditing pur-
poses. This would also allow for easier revocation of licenses or changing existing conditions in
a license.
Users: An user of the system could be an author or publisher (creator) using DRM to protect their
works or they could be a consumer (end user) wishing to access the DRM protected work. For
an end user to access a DRM protected work, the user must be able to produce a valid use
license for the DRM product. Likewise it is necessary to validate that the use license belongs to
the end user in question. If requested, it is also necessary to link payments or usage data of a
protected work for the creator.
Services: It is necessary for non-repudiation purposes to identify the web-services involved in a DRM
transaction. Thus a license issued by a license server will contain at least four identifiers: the
identifier of the license, the identifier of the object that the license is issued for, the identifier of
the end user and the identifier of the license server itself.
Receipts and Invoices: Services that charge a fee for a transaction (e.g. an user buying a digital
music from a distributor) require to document proof of payment or the invoice for the fee.
Similarly, the user requires a proof that he/she has paid the fee. Furthermore, license servers
would probably also require to link the use license with a payment receipt or invoice for auditing
purposes (as in the previous example of an user buying music online, the use license should not
be granted unless the user has paid for the right to use the music file).
Identifiers are handled by the Unique Number Issuer (UNI) service. The UNI’s schema caters for
two different root elements – SignedToken and SignedCommUnit. As discussed in section 3.4, the
SignedCommUnit caters for communication with the UNI. The SignedToken element contains the
identity token created by the UNI. Figure 2 shows the schema diagram for the SignedCommUnit
while Figure 4 shows the schema diagram for the SignedToken element.
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Figure 4: XML schema for SignedToken element for the UNI service
The Digital Object Identifier (DOI) has often been cited for use in a DRM system [22, 1, 21]. However,
while the DOI format achieves the main objectives of an identifier, it does not have a verification
feature. Thus there is no way to disprove that the identifier claimed by an object is not the actual
identifier of the object. For this reason we consider the DOI in its present form to be unsuitable for
DRM systems, but the UNI does build on the principles of the Handle service, which is what the DOI
system is built on [21].
In this chapter, we detail the services that the UNI must provide as well as give details on the identity
mechanisms of the framework. Each of the sub-elements in Figure 2 and Figure 4 are discussed in
more detail.
6.2 Identifier Format
The format for our identifier follows the specifications of the Handle format. The identifier is split
into two major parts: the prefix and the suffix. The prefix consists of the directory identifier and the
registration server identifiers. The suffix consists of the object class id, the id and the version of the
identifier. In general, the identifier should look like:
uni://directory id.registration server/object class/id/version
Object class is represented by integers; specifically:
• 0 representing data,
• 1 representing licenses,
• 2 representing users,
• 3 representing services and
• 4 representing receipts and invoices.
This scheme allows for the addition of further object classes by extending the mapping.
The registration server is responsible for the allocation of the actual identifier. The directory identifier
represents the server that allocated the identity of the registration server(for example, 10 represents
the DOI foundation). The directory identifier is handled by the Handle system.
The id is generated by the UNI and can be in any alpha-numeric scheme desired. It is left up to
the UNI to make sure that the id is unique. Combining the unique id with the rest of the identifier
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guarantees global uniqueness. Like the id, the version scheme does not have a prescribed format.
A suggestion is to use MajorVersion.SubVersion.MinorVersion format. Thus two objects of
different identifiers may have the same id, but by using different version numbers have globally unique
identifiers. It is recommended that objects with different versions keep the existing identifiers (or
maybe change identifiers at major versions). The major advantage is the flexibility in licensing, as
licenses could implement a wildcard scheme for access to objects.
Identifiers must be case insensitive. Although the handle system does prescribe the use of case sensitive
identifiers, the DOI foundation have commented on the complexity of such a system [21].
6.3 Identifying different unique identifier
The identifier scheme detailed in section 6.2 is not the only globally unique identifier. E-mail addresses,
IM identifiers, phone numbers (with international and regional dialing codes) are all globally unique
identifiers. There is a need to cater for these identifiers, esp. in handling user identities. Thus, we
introduce a second variation of the UNI format to cater for such identities.
uni://identifier type/identifier
The identifier type refers to the type (or protocol) of identifier represented. This should be an alpha-
numeric string that should be standardised to allow for inter-operability. Below, we list a few types
that could be considered for such a list. The identifier is the actual identifier for the listed type,
with the protocol reference stripped out (for example, for the Internet web address of W3C, the
identifier type is http, and the identifier is www.w3c.org). Similarly other identifiers including other
handle types like DOI can be handled. This identifier does not need a UNI to issue it, and thus does
not need the standard handle formatting. This also means that there is no way to verify the alternate
identifier, but we think that the main use of the alternate identifier would be for user identification,
which have their own verification mechanisms.
• http: representing Internet web addresses. Similar strings for other Internet protocols like ftp.
• email: representing email addresses.
• aim: representing AOL Instant messenger. Similar strings for other instant messengers like
Jabber, ICQ or MSN.
• passport: representing Microsoft Passport.
• liberty: representing Liberty Alliance’s federated identity management system.
6.4 Data, License, Receipt and Invoice Identification
Conceptually, the identifiers for these classes do not differ. The respective services that require an
identifier (requestor) should make use of the UNI for creating unique identifiers. Creating identifers
for users is more involved and is discussed in section 10. Issuing an identifier requires the digital
signature of the object. This can be used to verify an identifier later. The process for creating an
unique identifier for data, license, receipt and invoice classes is shown in figure 5 and discussed below.
The nonces are used to correlate requests and responses correctly and counter replay attacks.
Step 1: The requestor sends a request for an identifier to the UNI. The request must include the
following components:
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Figure 5: Fetching an identifier from the UNI
Figure 6: XML schema for requestDataIdentifierType type for the UNI service
1. The identifier of the requestor
2. The class of the object
3. The version of the object
4. If the object had a previous version with an identifier, the existing identifier and the digital
signature of the old object. Note this only applies if the old identifier was issued by the
current service in question. A different UNI service cannot guarantee that the older id field
is unused.
5. A timestamp of the request
6. A randomly generated nonce to identify the request.
The request token’s schema is shown in Figure 6.
Step 2: The UNI generates an identifier and returns it to the requestor. The identifier is not yet
issued – just set aside. The UNI policy must set a lifespan of the identifier. The UNI must
return a signed SOAP envelope to the requestor with the following details:
1. The identifier of the UNI
2. The identifier of the object
3. The identifier of the requestor
4. The timestamp of the identifier generation
5. The nonce sent in Step 1, as well as a challenge nonce.
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Figure 7: XML schema for respondDataIdentifierType type for the UNI service
Figure 8: XML schema for registerDataIdentifierType type for the UNI service
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Figure 9: XML schema for confirmDataIdentifierType type for the UNI service
The UNI’s response token’s schema is shown in Figure 7.
Step 3: Once the requestor has assembled the data package that required the identifier, it sends the
UNI a signed message with all the details that are required for registering an identifier. This
message must contain teh follwoing details:
1. The identifier of the requestor
2. The identifier of the object
3. The digital signature of the object
4. The resolution address of the identifier
5. Any additional information that may be required
6. The timestamp of the response generation
7. The challenge nonce and another nonce from the requestor
This token can be represented in an XML schema as demonstrated in figure 8.
Step 4: Once the UNI registers the identifier, the UNI sends a confirmation message to the requestor.
The confirmation message must contain the following details:
1. The identifier of the requestor
2. The identifier of the UNI
3. The object identifier
4. The timestamp of the response generation
5. The nonce generated by the requestor in Step 5.
This message can be described by an XML schema as shown in figure 9.
The identifier of the object needs to be generated first because the identifier might be needed as part
of the object (for example, the identifier for a receipt could be part of the receipt itself). Separating
the two creates a problem with generating the digital signature of the object. The UNI must not get
a copy of the actual data.
6.5 User Identification
Identification and authentication are strongly linked. For this reason, the details of user identification
is discussed in detail in section 10.
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6.6 Service Identification
Service identification is essentially the Internet address used to access the service. Services can provide
authentication and verification through the use of digital certificates as commonly used in current
day e-commerce sites. Alternately, services can meake use of the user identity tokens described in
section 10.
6.7 Unique Number Issuer (UNI)
As discussed earlier, the UNI service is an adaptatation of the Handle service. Thus the UNI needs to
provide the services required by the Handle service. The UNI can be public or private; with private
UNI’s serving only specific clients. All UNIs must:
1. Provide a service for issuing unique identifiers for data, licenses, receipts and invoices. The
requestor needs to provide a signed SOAP message with the digital signature of the object, the
class of the object (data, license or player), the address for the handle resolution, the version of
the object and if a previous version exists, the existing identifier. The UNI must then generate
a globally unique identifier. Further details on the format of the identifier is given in section 6.2
and the communication protocol is detailed in section 6.4.
2. Provide a service for issuing unique identifiers to users and services. This protocol is described in
section 10.3.2. The UNI must implement an email channel for communication with the requestor.
Other channels are optional. The handle for service and user identifiers should resolve to the
UNI if a specific URL is not selected.
3. Provide a handle resolution service. The handle should ideally resolve to a license server or
distributor for the identifier of a data object, the license server for a license and the appropriate
web service provider for an invoice or receipt. This is a requirement of the handle service.
4. Ensure persistence of the identifier even if the ownership of the license/data changes. For ex-
ample, if the right ownership of a book is transferred between two parties, the identifier of the
book should not change. This is a requirement of the handle service.
5. Provide a mechanism for verification. Given an identifier and a digital signature, the UNI must
be able to return a “valid” or “invalid” response. Whould the identifier be not issued by the
UNI, the UNI may route the request to the appropriate UNI and forward the request back to
the user. Responses must be signed by the UNI. Verification must be provided to any requestor.
6. Provide a mechanism to change the URL for handle resolution.
7. Web Service Description. Given a request, the UNI must service the requestor with at least the
following details:
(a) The owner of the web service.
(b) A human readable description of the service. This description can include other data that
might be useful to the requestor.
(c) Whether the service is public or private.
(d) The web service’s public key certificate.
(e) If public, the classes of identifiers serviced by the web service.
(f) If public, the payment details per class. If there is no such details, the web service can be
deemed to be free.
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6.8 Notes
6.8.1 Caching Optimisations
A possible missing service is the “request all tupples” which would return the identifiers and digital
signatures stored in a UNI server. Such a system would allow for aggressive caching for a network of
UNI servers and could make verification faster. However, should such a mechanism be allowed there
needs to be adequate access control with only “trusted” UNI servers allowed to access such a service.
6.8.2 Redundancy and Resilience
The main advantage of using the handle system is the handle resolution mechanism. The resolution
service should ideally resolve to a license server that would distribute end user licenses. The han-
dle service also acts as a persistent identifier and can handle multiple resolution addresses for load
balancing.
Thus even if the rights holders change the license server, there will be no need to change the identifier.
This removes the complexity from the end user if there is a change in rights holders, license servers
etc. It also for scalability – older distributed files do not need to be changed to use newer servers.
6.9 Scenario Analysis
The UNI is a required component and is used by all the scenarios. However the type of UNI deployment
can vary between the three scenarios.
In scenario 1, the UNI service is used in a limited scope (can basically serve just the university).
However, protected data is often distributed to users who are not part of the university. Thus, while
the UNI itself needs to only serve the university, it needs to be accessible by the public.
In scenario 2, the UNI service needs to be publicly accessible. In fact, a business model where a person
or enterprise operates and maintains a UNI service is possible. Thus the music store could make use
of this service for handling the data identities.
In scenario 3, the UNI service is entirely private and public access can be reduced. This increases the
security of the data, as any requests to the UNI service could be retraced to track potential leaked
data.
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7 Creating Protected Data
Data protected using DRM entails creating an encrypted package, a set of access rules and maybe
some identification mechanisms for the data such as watermarking or fingerprinting.
The Service Producer component is responsible for creating DRM packages. The set of access rules,
or rights are handled by the License Server. In this section we detail process of creating a protected
package.
7.1 The Service Producer: Creating a DRM Package
Figure 10: Creating a DRM Package
The process of creating a DRM package is shown in figure 10 and explained below.
Step 1: The user transfers the data file(s) to the service producer over a secure connection (for
example through a SSL tunnel). The user also selects the options he/she would like on the
DRM package, including encryption format, watermarking, compression etc. These options are
further discussed in section 7.2. We recomend the use of the File Transfer Protocol (FTP) for
transfering files. This protocol is fairly lightweight, widely supported and can be implemented
through a secure communication tunnel. We do recognise that FTP is an insecure protocol, but
the use of a secure connection does overcome the security problems of FTP. Figure 11 shows the
XML schema that could be used to communicate these options.
Step 2 & 3: The service producer gets an identifier from the UNI and then assembles the DRM
package. The process of getting an identifier is detailed in section 6.4, and assembly of the DRM
package is discussed in section 7.2.
Step 4: The service producer can then forward the DRM package back to a distributor or transfer
it back to the user. This option can be chosen by the user in step 1, or could be the part of
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Figure 11: XML schema of a signed request to create a DRM package
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Figure 12: XML schema of a signed receipt from the service producer
the service producer policy. The user is given a “receipt”, which ties the object to the user and
the service producer. This token can then be used to prove to the license server that the user
creating the license terms for the package is the rights holder of the package. Figure 12 shows
the XML schema of such a token. The service provider could also forward the user to a selected
license server.
7.2 Package Format
Figure 13: Proposed Layered approach for a DRM package
A DRM enabled data file is essentially an encrypted file with some metadata. It is the range of
possible metadata that makes it more suitable than a simple data encryption. Current encrypted
packages normally make use of an encrypted file and its digital signature as the package. However
there are other security features that could also be useful – data could be fingerprinted for additional
protection, or in some media, a watermark could be added to the package for a different identification
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mechanism. Current DRM systems however do not offer such flexibility and most of them do not offer
watermarking or fingerprinting options. In this section we propose a flexible package format that we
hope to be a base for a standardised package format.
A standardised package format is crucial for inter-operability. However fingerprints, encryption stan-
dards etc. must be flexible to suit the needs of the rights holder. For this reason we propose a layered
approach to the problem – with each layer containing information about the technology used (for
example, the encryption layer details the encryption algorithm and parameters for the algorithm).
The layered approach is shown in figure 13. Currently, the layers we have are:
1. Data: The bottom layer, and represents the raw data that needs to be protected. The package
allows for any type of data, and the end application needs to determine the type before
using the data.
2. Metadata: Metadata is data about the data. Metadata is optional, and could be in any format.
3. Secondary Security: This layer allows for the service producer to add “extra” security features
such as watermarks to the data or take a fingerprint of the data. These measures do not
necessarily add to the protection of the data, but do carry other benefits. For example,
watermarks can allow easy identification of images even when converted to an analogue
form. Secondary security features are optional.
4. Embedded Use License: The embedded use license is optional and can be used to specify
simple rules. The terms of the use license will be overwritten by any external use license.
If an embedded use license is used, a separate key to unlock the encryption is required.
5. Compression: This layer can optionally compress the separate files from the previous layer
as one compressed file. The package needs to describe the algorithm used as well as any
parameters. Compression allows for faster encryption and hashing operations.
6. Encryption: The encryption layer describes the encryption algorithm and parameters used.
All the layers preceding the encryption layer are encrypted with the same algorithm and
parameters. The remaining layers remain unencrypted. Strictly speaking, encryption is not
mandatory, and can be ignored – although this fails to provide any real protection to the
data.
7. Unique Identifier: The identifier is issued by the UNI as described previously and all copies
of the object will have the same identifier. The identifier should not be encrypted as any
DRM controller needs to access the identifier to match with the use license. The identifier
is mandatory.
8. Digital Signature: The digital signature provides support for the integrity of the data. The
digital signature is a signed one way hash of the encrypted data concatenated with the
identifier. The data package must detail the algorithm, the parameters and attach the
signature to the final package.
The layers show how the service producer can process the data to create the DRM package, and
similarly show the reverse steps for the DRM controller to access the package.
Using scenario 2, if a band wants to create a package with watermarking but no fingerprinting, no
embedded use license, zip compression, AES 128 bit encryption with SHA-1 hashing, it is easy to
specify and create. Similarly the end user’s DRM controller can easily decipher the package and
access the file once an appropriate use license is secured.
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Figure 14: XML schema diagrams for DRM package and DRM package metadata
NEED TO WORK ON THE XML SCHEMAS IN THIS SECTION The package (excluding
the compr) can be fully captured in XML. However, because of the processing power required to
process XML files, it could be easier to separate the data and meta-data. Figure 14 shows the XML
schema diagrams for both approaches.
7.3 Scenario Analysis
As discussed earlier, the Service Producer component is required by all deployments. But, like the
UNI service, the service producer component can be shared by a number of deployed systems. We
expect however enterprises to deploy their own service producers, while consumers could make use of
public service producers instead of deploying their own. The service producer is not a complicated
component, and thus it is also possible for every user to run their own personal service producer
services.
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8 Distributing DRM protected data
The core requirement of a DRM system is to protect data regardless of the location of the data. Thus
the manner of distribution must not affect the security of the protected data. Furthermore, we specify
the separation of the use license and the actual data, and thus a central distribution point for the
data does not have any real benefits. In fact the use of peer-to-peer (P2P) distribution networks such
as bit-torrent can lead to more efficient distribution when compared to a centralised approach5. For
these reasons, the distributor is an optional component of the system.
The distributor can take different roles depending on how it is deployed. In a corporate environment,
the role of the distributor can easily be a central file server. For a media store (like Apple’s iTunes
Music store for example), the store can be a traditional online store. In the later scenario, the store
can also deploy a license server to serve the licensing needs of the user.
It is possible to use a distributor to “personalise” every distributed copy, for example through the use
of a different encryption key or by using different settings. While this type of distribution is more
computationally expensive, it does provide better security – a breach of a encryption key minimises
the potential damage, and leaks are also easier to track. While this mechanism is probably not useful
for distributing media to the public in the near future, it could be very useful in protecting very
sensitive data that is not meant to be widely distributed.
The distributor essentially has three types of interactions – uploading data to the distributor, down-
loading data to the user, and browsing, listing etc. the data stored by the distributor. For intra-
enterprise usage, these functions are provided by most file storage systems. For inter-enterprise or
consumer systems, these functionalities can be easily provided by a FTP server. We do not prescribe
any approach to a distributor; but if the distributor makes use of an open standard, it would make it
easier for users of the distributor to make use of the service.
In section 7, the specified that the Service Producer can forward a newly assembled DRM package to
the distributor. This function can only be provided if the component can interact with the distributor.
The use of FTP protocol is probably the easiest in this regard, as this is the recommended protocol
for the Service Producer.
8.1 Scenario Analysis
Scenario 2 is the only scenario which we think needs a distributor, and it is a simple online store.
Scenario 3 deals with very sensitive data that is not widely distributed and the data is most likely to
be stored in a central storage area and not regularly accessed. Thus it is possible to use a distributor to
personalise the data for every different request (and also store the data in a DRM envelope). However,
the nature of the deployment means that data needs to be accessed at high speed, and thus this form
of distribution may not be practical.
5P2P networks are more resilient to denial of service attacks and can usually handle larger traffic volumes without
compromising the quality of service. However, the performance of the networks do differ according to the P2P protocol
used.
32
9 Accessing Protected Data
The DRM protected data is distributed within an encrypted package. To open the package, the end
user requires a key that can decrypt the contents. Ideally, this key should be distributed along with
the use license which specify the conditions for access to the data.
In this section we detail the process through which a DRM enabled work can be accessed by an
application. Since DRM aims to protect data regardless of where the data actually resides, the
distribution of DRM protected data does not concern us. Therefore we assume that the end user has
got a DRM protected data and wishes to access it.
9.1 Components
The user role in our framework (see figure 1) can comprise of a few components. The main components
are outlined below, but there can be other modules that fit in the user space, like a Rights Interpretation
Layer as discussed by Jamkhedkar et al. in [17]. A module that is very important but not discussed is
the key storage mechanism. The efficient and secure storage of keys is important for the effectiveness
of the system, but this functionality depends on a lot of other factors such as the platform.
1. DRM Controller: This component is enforces the rules laid out by the use license. Ideally
this would be an operating system kernel module or a hardware level implementation.
However, the controller could be at an application level also, but the protection offered by
an application level DRM controller is lower. The DRM controller is discussed in more
detail in section 9.4.
2. Communication Module: This component would be used to communicate to the license
server, authentication services and any other communication required.
3. License Store: This component stores, indexes and manages use licenses for the user. The
store is used primarily by the DRM controller, but the store could offer mechanisms for
oﬄine uploading of use-licenses or even automatic updating of use-licenses etc. through
the communication module. Ideally, the license store will be a tamper-resistant hardware
module, but such a device will probably not be available for some time.
4. Revocation List: There is a need to keep track of invalid use licenses. Use licenses could
become invalid for a variety of reasons like the end user upgrading the terms of the license
or the end user transfering the right to a different party. Ideally the revocation list gets
updated at regular intervals, but it could be possible to distribute revocation lists with use
licenses. However, even though revocation lists need only be the use-license identifiers, the
list could become very large, and separation of the use-license and revocation list would be
preferred. Alternatively, the license server could also allow online verification for the the
use-license’s validity.
9.2 Process – Accessing DRM enabled data
The main responsibility of a DRM system is to enforce the access controls for that system, and
that responsibility lies with the DRM controller module. The remaining components are involved in
supplying all the required data to the DRM controller. In this subsection we shall show the access
paths for scenario A (section 2.1, and an overview of the process is shown in figure 15. The access
pattern will be the same regardless of the scenario and thus we do not repeat the access path for all
the scenarios.
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Figure 15: Steps required to use a DRM enabled work
Carl has distributed to the protected exam papers to the lecturers concerned. We describe the process
that takes place when a lecturer, James, wants to view the exam.
Step 1: The application recognises that the file is DRM enabled and thus cannot open the file.
Step 2: The application asks the DRM controller if it can open the file. If the DRM controller is an
operating system or hardware module, it could have intercepted the application’s initial attempt
at opening the file and thus handled it automatically. The DRM controller is discussed in more
detail in section 9.4.
Step 3: The DRM controller looks up whether an use license exists for the data file in question. The
license store gives the DRM controller the license if it exists or a message indicating a license for
the data file does not exist yet. If the license exists, the DRM controller moves to step 7. The
license store could have an expired license6, in which case the DRM controller continues with
step 4.
Step 4: The DRM controller contacts the license server (by resolving the UNI of the data) for a use
license. The user authenticates themselves to the license server, pays for the license if required
and should also be allowed to negotiate with the license server for specific terms if the rights
holder allows for such an option. The authentication process is detailed in section 10 while the
license server is discussed in more detail in section 12.
Step 5: If a license is granted, it is transferred to the DRM controller. If a license is not granted, an
appropriate error message is sent to the DRM controller. If a license is not granted, the user
should be prevented from accessing the file.
Step 6: The DRM controller stores the use license in the license store.
Step 7: The DRM Controller checks the validity of use license against the revocation list. As ex-
plained previously, this action could be done online with the license server. If the license is
invalid, the user could negotiate a new license with the license server (Step 4).
6A license expires once the last date of the license passes. An invalid license is a license that is put on the revocation
list but not necessarily expired. Once an invalid license expires, it can be removed from the revocation list.
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Step 8: The DRM controller authenticates the user (James) against the user specified in the use
license. More detail on user authentication is given in section 10. If authentication fails, the
user should be prevented from accessing the file.
Step 9: If authentication is successful, and the use license allows the action the application wishes
to perform, a positive message is sent to the application. For every subsequent action that the
application wishes to perform (for example, if James wishes to print a copy of the exam), Steps
2 and 9 are performed if the DRM controller can cache a copy of the use license in use. Should
the license expire during use, steps 5 – 8 need to be redone. Authentication of the user is not
necessary for every action, but can be scaled according to the use license – for example the
license may stipulate that the user needs to authenticate themselves after every hour of use.
9.3 Time Synchronisation
Time synchronisation is a solved problem, and most modern operating systems offer time synchroni-
sation protocols. Having UNI and license servers as time server could be very beneficial, as most end
users are likely to make use of these servers regularly.
9.4 DRM Controller
As discussed earlier, the DRM controller can be implemented at various levels in a computer system
– at an application level, as an operating system module and at a hardware level. The level of
protection is lowest at the application level – there is no way for the DRM controller to stop operating
system functions (such as file copy). Currently, all DRM systems make use of application level DRM
controllers.
A DRM controller implemented as an operating system module can be far more effective. Now,
applications no longer need to be modified to access DRM enabled files – the kernel catches the
request to access the file, makes a descision on the request and then allows or disallows an application
to carry out that request. Thus the application should not even need to know whether the file is DRM
protected or not. However, kernels can be patched, and it is still software control. Thus, while the
security and usability offered by a kernel level DRM system is very promising, the protection offered
is not absolute. Curently, Microsoft’s Rights Management Services (RMS) has the closest kernel level
DRM controller implementation but it still requires application level changes to function.
A DRM controller as a chip is ultimate, as hardware level circuits are difficult to bypass. However,
hardware level DRM does also have a counter problem – flexibility becomes harder to achieve, and
while software can be easily patched or upgraded, hardware is harder to upgrade.
9.5 Notes
The crux of the security lies in the authentication of the user against the use license. The model
described above allows for portability – the user can carry their data and license to a different device
(with a compatabile DRM controller and applications) and access the data as long as they can authen-
ticate themselves to the DRM controller. These authentication processes are detailed in section 10.
The DRM controller can also have other functionalities. All the current RELs strive for generality, and
thus even though they offer standardised grammar, the semantics of the grammar is not standardised.
However, standardising the semantics can lose the generality of the REL – for example the term render
requires different interpretations for image, video and audio files. In [17], the authors proposed the
idea of a “Rights Interpretation Layer”, a module that can interpret the different semantics of the
license. Such a module should be part of the DRM controller.
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It would also be useful for the DRM controller to allow loading of licenses as an additional function.
Thus the license does not have to be downloaded from the license server, but from a file on disk. This
feature will be particularly useful in providing mobility for the user and for devices not connected to
the Internet (for example portable music players).
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10 User Authentication
There are two different times when an user would require authentication in the system. Firstly, there
is a need for the user to authenticate themselves to the various Web Services – the license server,
the distributor, the service producer etc. This authentication can be done using various Web Service
enabled authentication mechanisms including federated identity management schemes such as Liberty
or WS-Federation, proprietary solutions such as Microsoft Passport or even custom authentication
services that are linked to the corporate network, like to an LDAP service. Except for the license
server, authentication for the other services depends on the particular deployment of the system.
The second authentication occurs at step 8 of the access process detailed in section 9. In Step
8, the user is required to authenticate themselves to the DRM controller. Here the user provides
authentication to prove that the use-license belongs to the user that wishes to access the protected
data. This authentication can be done through an online authentication protocol (which would require
the user to have a connection to the authentication server) or through oﬄine mechanisms.
Online authentication requires an active network connection to the server and is mostly beneficial to
rights holders as they can retain a larger degree of control over their work. Thus in a rental scheme,
the rights holders can suspend an account if the user has not paid his/her bills. Online authentication
however also allows the rights holders to actively monitor the frequency of usage through how often
the user authenticates themselves online. Oﬄine authentication on the other hand is more beneficial
to the user. The rights holders loose most of their control on the user as the user does not need any
interaction with the license server after purchase. In this section, we look at how online and oﬄine
authentication can be achieved.
10.1 User and their Use License
Like every other component in the system, the user also requires a globally unique identifier. However,
the UNI service does not have to be the only source of this identifier – other global identifier schemes
such as Liberty or Microsoft Passport can also be used for this purpose. The DRM controller however
must be able to interpret and process this identifier. The user may have multiple unique identifiers,
both online and oﬄine identifiers, and the DRM controller must be able to handle such a variety.
In section 6.3, we detailed an alternate identifier format that caters to other identifier formats. The
main use of the alternate identifier formats will be in use licenses as a mechanism to identify the user.
Thus it will be possible for the use license to specify virtually any identifier for the user, and the DRM
controller will be able to interpret the identifier. Modularising the authentication mechanisms for the
DRM controller should allow for the DRM controller to support multiple authentication schemes.
10.2 Online Authentication
All current DRM systems employ online authentication. In systems such as Apple iTunes, the iTunes
store authenticates the computer running the iTunes software (which is essentially the software and
DRM controller) as a trusted machine; and the machine is then able to play audio files bought from
the music store. Other systems such as Microsoft’s RMS platform, the RMS client authenticates the
user against the company’s active directory server, and then retrieves a use license from the RMS
server. This use license is usually time locked and expires after a specific period.
Online authentication is only needed in cases where the protected data requires a high degree of pro-
tection or where the end user is not trusted enough to use oﬄine authentication. Online authentication
provides a high degree of security, as use licenses can be easily revoked if the user breaches the license
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agreement or is no longer trusted by the rights holder. However, there are also privacy concerns, as
online authentication allows the right holder to easily track the user’s usage.
Alternatively, online authentication can be used to generate a second use license that is time locked, or
locked with a particular device. The use license could then direct the DRM controller not to conduct
authentication in step 8. This type of use license could also be generated by the license server as the
initial license.
Any Web Service based authentication system can be used for online authentication. An obvious
system would be the federated identity management systems like Liberty Alliance or implementations
of the WS-Federation. As discussed in section 6.3, use license can make use of the alternate identifier
format to identify the protocol for authentication. Thus we do not specify any particular authentication
mechanism.
10.3 Oﬄine Authentication
Oﬄine authentication is highly desirable, especially if DRM is to succeed in the consumer space.
However, oﬄine authentication is difficult to achieve – users and services do not have secure hashes
that can be easily verified. An intermediate token can be used to solve this problem; the token has
an identifier and the possession of the token can be used to prove authentication.
Ideally, the token should be hardware based, unique, mobile and tamper resistant. One such token
is described in section 10.4. Another token is the smartcard based system used in the Estonian
Digital Signature Project [5]. The smart card doubles up as an identity document, and provides a
public/private keypair, a digital certificate and an oﬄine authentication mechanism. However, neither
token is available in mass circulation – the latter available in Estonia while the former only on certain
laptops. For this reason we discuss an alternative software based mechanism in this section.
Digital certificates provide the requirements of a token based system, and they have an additional
advantage in providing a PKI interface. However digital certificates have two main drawbacks:
1. Number of different formats
2. Expiry (and revocations) of digital certificates
The identifier lifetime is expected to be longer than the lifetime of a digital certificate. In section 4.2
we advocated using PGP as the standard PKI system. PGP certificates do have the advantage of
having an optional expiry date, but revocation of a PGP certificate remain a problem. If a certificate
is revoked, the owner of the certificate should not loose access to their data since revocation of a
certificate means that the identifier associated with the certificate is also revoked. While it could be
argues that one can re-use the same identifier with a new certificate, this mechanism is not ideal as
revocation lists of digital certificates works by associating the identifiers of the certificates.
Yet another problem with a certificate based identity is portability. Because current certificate systems
are software based, they can easily be replicated. A good example is the OSS Sound Drivers for Unix
platforms available from 4-Front Technologies. 4-Front uses a PGP certificate to grant use licenses to
the end users. However, these use licenses are easily available online as individuals who buy a license
can easily distribute the license afterwards (although it is illegal). However portability is also a key
requirement of a DRM system. End users must be able to move the data they have rights to between
machines they own. Ideally, an identification system for end user must take this into account.
We propose a 3 token system that provides authentication, identification and mobility. These tokens
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are:
A user/service identity token which can be used to identify the user. The identity token must be
as permanent as possible, provide anonymity but at the same time allow the UNI to verify the
user of the token by some means. It would also be useful to have the identity token provide a
verification mechanism itself.
A device identifier list which lists the devices owned by the user or service. Use licenses that only
allow a limited number of devices to be used should use the list to assign the devices to the use
license.
Digital certificates which will be used for PKI purposes. Both the device identifier list and identity
tokens must be signed by their owners, and the digital certificate can be used to link the tokens
together as only the digital certificate can verify the signature.
In the following two sections we describe the specifications of the tokens as well as detail the protocol
for creating the tokens.
10.3.1 User Identity Token
The xml schema diagram of the proposed document is given in Figure 16. This token is part of the
SignedToken element. We recommend following the PGP certificate style and have a minimum of two
signatures for SignedToken – the signature of the token’s owner, and the signature of the UNI that
releases an identifier.
Figure 16: XML schema diagram for the userIDType type
The contents of the token have five mandatory elements and one optional element. The identifier
element is the identifier as given by the UNI. A possible transaction mechanism between the UNI and
the user is described later. The second element is a channel element. The channel will be used as a
means of authenticating the user; and only one channel is required. As shown in Figure 17, the ID
token currently provides for email, cellular phone, pager and common instant messenger as channels.
A custom channel type and ID is also available and thus even the traditional letter can be used as
a channel. The third mandatory element is the identifier of the UNI. This effectively identifies the
issuer of the identifier.
The next two fields are the timestamp and password elements. We have used the password storing
mechanism of UNIX [27] for the token. The password should be hashed using SHA-1 and then stored
in the token. To add complexity to the hashing, the timestamp should be concatenated with the
password before hashing. This would ensure to some extent, that even if the passwords chosen by
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Figure 17: XML schema diagram for the channelDescriptionType type
Figure 18: Steps in generating a Global User Identity Token
two users are the same, the resulting hashes are different. This mechanism ensures that the the ID
token is self validating; if a user needs to authenticate themselves, they can present the token and the
password.
The optional description field can be used for any other information that the user would like to have
on the token. There is no field for name or any other identification mechanism in the token to protect
the user’s privacy, but this information can be put in the description field if required. Another option
is to create a custom token for personal data, and use the identifier issued by the UNI to link the
custom token with the identifier token.
10.3.2 Creating a User ID Token
There are 5 simple steps in creating a User ID token, as shown in Figure 18. These steps will be
discussed in more detail below.
Step 1: The end user requests the UNI for an unique identifier. This can be in the form of a web
based interface, or through a web service with a client application. As part of the request, the
user chooses a channel for a response and the appropriate channel identifier. This ensures that
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Figure 19: XML schema diagram for the requestIDType type
Figure 20: XML schema diagram for the requestIDTokenSignature type
there is a “real” person who will own the user token and the email based system is currently
used frequently in many online registration systems for activating online accounts. The channel
response is not limited to an email, and should the UNI support other mechanisms, like a sms
to a cellphone, the user could make use of it. The UNI must implement the email channel. A
timestamp is also present, and the UNI can discard all requests that are “stale”. The amount
of time before a request is deemed to be stale can be decided by the UNI. The XML schema for
such a request token is shown in Figure 19
Step 2: The UNI creates an unique identifier and sends the identifier through the channel selected by
the user.
Step 3: The user assembles the identity token using the identifier, the channel that was used to commu-
nicate the identifier, the UNI’s identifier and the list of devices owned or used by the user. The
user then signs the content block with his private key. As in PGP certificates, signing an own
public key is very important [26] – it ensures that no third party including the UNI has made
any changes to the identity token.
Step 4: The user then sends the identity token back to the UNI. As in step 1, a timestamp field is also
present in the request as well as an optional handle resolution URL. If the handle resolution
URL is not present, the identifier should resolve to the UNI. The XML schema for the request
token is shown in Figure 20
Step 5: The UNI signs the identity token and then sends it back to the user. The XML schema for the
response token is shown in Figure 21. The identifierToken is an instance of a SignedToken. By
signing the identity token, the UNI certifies that the identifier in token was:
(a) was generated by the UNI, and that
(b) the channel id matches the identifier
The UNI also stores the signature with the identifier in its database and set the appropriate
handle resolution address. This will allow the UNI to provide a verification service. Details on
the verification service can be found in section 6.7.
10.3.3 Changing a User Identity Token
If the owner of an ID token wishes to change the token (i.e. change the details of the channel type and
ID, the description or the password) then it would require a modification of the token. The user’s ID
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Figure 21: XML schema diagram for the returnIDTokenSignature type
cannot be modified; as the user can easily get a new token if they desire. Token modification is quite
simple. As in token creation, the requestor assembles their new token and sign it. The new token and
the old token is then sent to the UNI (XML schema shown in Figure 22). The UNI then sends a nonce
along the new channel to the token owner. The owner would then need to send an accept message
back to the UNI thereby verifying the validity of the channel. The UNI can then sign the new token,
update its database and send the signed token back to the requestor.
Figure 22: XML schema diagram for the modifyIDType type
The user should use a password for authentication, but this feature might not be necessary in closed
environments. This is the only scenario where an authentication service is required for the UNI. All
other services should be open, although access control can be employed should there be a need to
restrict the users of the UNI.
10.3.4 Device Identifier List
Unlike the identifiers discussed previously, device identifiers cannot be independently verified. In fact
creating unique hardware identifiers themselves are a challenge, and there are no standards on uniquely
identifying electronic devices. Although it is possible to construct an unique identifier using the serial
numbers of the components in the device (like the processor, the network interface card, motherboard
etc) there does not seem to be any standardised algorithm to extract such information. Furthermore,
except for network interface cards, hardware devices do not have a standard mechanism for serial
numbers. There is also the added complexity of changes in the hardware profile of a device due to
upgrading components.
In these specifications we do not give a mechanism to identify hardware. License servers that wish to
restrict usage to specific devices need to:
1. Find a scheme to uniquely identify a device, and
2. create a mechanism to verify that the identifier has not been tampered with.
The second part could be implemented through the use of an application that extracts the hardware
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Figure 23: XML schema diagram for the deviceIDType type
identifier, creates the identifier token and then signs the token. A XML schema to represent the
device list token is shown in Figure 23. The TTPIdentifier field identifies the trusted third party (or
application) that generated the token (or signed the token). The OwnerIdentifier field containts the
identifier of the owner of the token. The device list token forms part of SignedToken and thus the
request and return signature XML schemas (Figure 20 and Figure 21) discussed above can also be
used for requesting a TTP to sign the token through a web service. The token does not have an UNI
issued identifier and thus there must not be any URL to resolve to.
10.4 Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
The Trusted Computing Group (TCG) is an industry consortium that aims to develop and promote
an open industry standard for trusted computing [12]. The consortium consists of leading hardware
vendors like IBM, Intel and Hewlett-Packard. The Trusted Platform Module is an unique, trusted,
tamper resistant hardware module from the TCG. Currently, only available on laptops from a few
vendors, the TPM provides certified RSA key pairs, as well as a protocol to provide online authenti-
cation without compromising user privacy [12]. Such a module would be ideal for authentication in a
DRM system even with the lack of mobility. If the TPM can be produced in a mobile format (similar
to USB flash drives for example), mobility can also be provided.
The TPM (and any other hardware based system) is also compatible with the system proposed in
section 10.3. The hardware modules all have unique identifiers, and thus can be listed in the device
list. Thus a user can have portability if the use license allows the user to use a subset of the devices
listed on the device list. The digital certificate however can become unnecessary if the hardware based
system provides public key cryptography.
10.5 Summary
In this section, we looked at the authentication requirements for the user. The TPM promises to
provide a great solution to user identification and authentication, as it supports both online and
oﬄine authentication support. Furthermore, it provides mechanisms for user privacy and thus is ideal
for DRM. Mobile TPM would also allow usage in multiple devices like PDAs. However, until TPM
becomes commonly available, we provide an alternative (but possibly less secure) mechanism for user
authentication and identification.
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10.6 Scenario Analysis
As discussed by Mulligan et al. [19], consumers should have limited interactions with the rights hold-
ers after they complete their purchase. Thus in scenario 2, oﬄine authentication is the best solution.
Oﬄine authentication also satisfies the requirement of end user privacy for scenario 2. However, in
scenarios 1 and 3 tracking is a requirement and thus online authentication is the solution. Both sce-
narios already have possible online authentication mechanisms such as the user management systems
used in the existing computer network.
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11 Credentials Authority
Copyright law in most countries allow users certain rights depending on the use of the material. For
example, under South African copyright law, teachers and academics are allowed to make reproductions
of copyrighted material if it is used for teaching purposes [2]. Similarly journalists are allowed to
excerpt quotes for the purpose of reviews. A difficulty in current DRM systems is that there is no
mechanism to distinguish between users, like whether a user is a teacher, and thus all users are given
the same rights. This results in conflicts with fair use allowances in copyright laws.
Credentials can be used to solve this problem, if a trustworthy structure is set-up to facilitate such
a transaction. For example, professional organisations such as ACM or IEEE can provide credential
authorities who can certify whether a user is a member of a the organisation or not. Thus, provided
trusted authorities can set up credential authorities, they can prove to the license server that the user
is a certain “type” of user.
Figure 24 shows the two ways the credentials authority can be used. Firstly, when the user can request
a license with fair use requirements, and forward the credential service that can provide the credential
for the fair use. The license server can then contact the credential authority on the user’s behalf and
get the credential. Alternatively, the user can get the credential from the credential authority and
forward it to the license server. If the credential authority is trusted by the license server, the license
server can provide the user with the fair use requests.
Figure 24: Using the Credentials Authority
Another function that can be performed by the credentials authority is that of access control. Access
control does not require any modification to how the service is defined above. Regardless of the use,
the credentials authority is strongly linked to the authentication service, and both services may be
provided by the same web service.
11.1 Representing Credentials
Currently there are no web services standards or recommendations for credentials. Use of WS-Trust
or WS-Security has been suggested for the use of credentials. Iny [14], the authors suggest the use of
Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI) for credentials. UDDI is currently used by
the service registry in the web services model. It provides service requestors means to find services
provided by service providers. The authors propose an extension to the function of the service registry
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to provide credential services.
11.2 Scenario Analysis
Credentials could be used in both scenario 2 and 3. As discussed above, credentials could be used as
a mechanism to negotiate fair use, and thus useful for scenario 2.
In scenario 3, the use of credentials would be different. Ideally, medical records of an individual
should only be accessible by the persons authorised by the patient, like his/her doctor. However, a
situation may arise where the patient is in a critical condition and no authorised personnel is available
to authorise access. In a credentials model, the patient can choose to allow doctors and nurses of a
certain level access to the data (for example, surgeon on call can open file). The credentials model
will still allow for confidentiality, and also allow to track cases where data is accessed when there was
no need (the patient is perfectly healthy but data is still accessed by the surgeon for example).
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12 Licensing
The use license specifies the conditions for accessing the DRM enabled data; and usually caries the
decryption key for the DRM package. The issuing of use licenses is handled by the license server
component. In this section, the protocol for issuing a use-license is discussed as well as the format of
the use license.
The process of the getting a use-license can be broken up into three parts:
1. Authentication,
2. Negotiation and
3. Creation and issuing of the license.
The license server is also used by the creators (or license holders) to create the licenses. The creators
can create various versions of licenses, and should be allowed to have multiple types of licenses for the
same object. The user will always communicate with the license server and acts as the proxy rights
holder. In this section, the majority of the communication will be between the end-user and the rights
holder with the rights holder’s role handled by the license server. The process of creating use-license
templates can be broken up into two parts:
1. Authentication, and
2. Creation of templates
12.1 Authentication
Authentication of a user has two functions in the license server. Firstly, authentication allows the
user to prove that they have the right to access the license server. This is important in a corporate
environment as the corporation may decide only certain users should have the right to create or use
protected document. This authentication should ideally take place using a federated identity system to
maintain consistency across different components. The second purpose of authentication is to create
a link between the use license and user (either as a creator or as the end user). This link is not
necessary in the later case, as license servers are likely to provide “gift services” where the purchaser
of the license is not the consumer of the product. In such a case, the purchaser can ask the license
server to issue a license against a different user identifier.
Because of the distributed nature of the system, it is possible for anyone to create license templates for
a DRM work. To restrict only the rights holders to create license templates, we introduced a receipt
token in section 7.1. The receipt token can be used to prove that the user creating the license template
is the license holder.
There is a complication however, when the user creating the package is not the license holder (for
example, in a corporate environment, the rights will usually belong to the company and not the
employee). This problem can be solved in two ways – either issue the token with a different user
identifier from the package manager, or have a separate signed token transferring the rights from one
user to another. The former approach is simpler while the later approach has the advantage of being
useful after the DRM package has been created. However, with the later approach, it does not stop
the first user from creating his/her own license template with a different license server.
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12.2 Negotiation
The use license is in effect a contract – the end user agrees to a set of rules that they are going to
adhere to in order to get access to the data. In current systems, these rules are fixed by the rights
holders and none of the current DRM systems allow for a change in these rules. However there are
lots of cases where a change in the terms of the contract are desirable and maybe even necessary.
Furthermore, because there is no interaction between the end user and the rights holder, the terms
of the use license are usually the same for every end user. However, as discussed in [17], it would
be advantageous to tailor the use licenses according to the end user – for example, if an end user is
trusted by the rights holder, the rights holder is likely to give him/her less restrictive rights than an
untrusted end user.
There are three requirements before negotiation can take place between the end user and the rights
holder; there needs to be a standardised language to conduct negotiations, a Rights Expression Lan-
guage (REL)7 that is capable of expressing various templates of use licenses that the rights holder
is willing to provide and a program good enough to conduct a negotiation and pick the correct use
license.
12.2.1 Expressing Negotiations
Current REL standards can only express the rules from the rights holders perspective [18]. In this
regard, in an earlier work [8], we discussed extensions to two common RELs – XrML and ODRL –
that would allow for end users to communicate requests to the rights holder. The use of a REL to
conduct negotiations is simpler than creating a separate language for conducting negotiations. This is
because there will not be a need to convert the negotitaed contract from the “negotiation language”
to the REL. Thus we believe, extending a current REL is a better option than creating a negotiation
language.
In our scheme, we extended the standards with 3 requests from the user – to add additional rights, to
remove existing rights and to replace existing rights with new rights. There are also two extetions for
the rights holder – to grant a request and to deny a request.
12.2.2 Creating Templates
Before negotiations can take place, the rights holder must decide the terms of the licenses he/she is
willing to allow. Thus the rights holder must set a number of different “offers”8. Ideally it would
be useful to generate patterns for common offers, like templates for educators would be very similar
in a consumer environment. In closed environments, the template could be generated around roles –
for example templates in a corporation can be designed according to employee positions (managers,
secretary etc). In the extreme case, templates could be generated around user identifiers – if the rights
holder knows the specific requirements of certain users, then the templates can be generated along
those lines.
On the other hand, in a consumer environment, the rights holder could require payment for certain
rights. In such an environment, the rights holder can charge the user for the amount of flexibility the
customer requires – for example, in a music store, the basic right could allow no mobility; but the
customer could buy the mobility right for an additional charge, or maybe in place of another right.
As mentioned earlier, it would be desirable to express license templates with a REL. However, even
7A REL is a language used to express rights in use licenses. RELs are discussed in more detail in section 12.3
8This is a term from the ODRL REL. In ODRL, the rights holder offers a set of terms to the end user, which if the
end user accepts generate a use license agreement.
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though ODRL offers an “offer” syntax, we are not sure that any current REL has the syntax to express
the options described above. This is discussed further in section 12.3.
12.2.3 Conducting Negotiations
Negotiations for licenses can take place at two points – when a new license is being generated, or when
an end user wants to change the terms of an existing license. In the later case, the negotiations should
continue from the existing license conditions.
Figure 25: Negotiating for a use license
Negotiations essentially comprise a set of “requests” from the end user and responses from the license
server on the requests. This process can be broken into 5 steps and as shown in figure 25 and detailed
below.
Step 1: The user assembles the license request. The interface for the user could be the DRM controller
component, or alternatively an online web site. As discussed earlier, ideally the request is created
using the REL used for the use license.
Step 2: The license server analyses the license request and identifies one or more licenses that match
close to the user’s request.
Step 3: The license server sends these as separate “offers” to the user.
Step 4: The user can then either choose a license or make additional requests, in which case Step 1
- 4 are repeated.
Step 5: Once the user has chosen an offer, the license server can generate the license matching the
offer.
12.2.4 Generating Use Licenses
Once the terms of the license have been negotiated, generating the use license should be trivial as long
as the negotiation language is the same as the REL. The use license must be signed by the license
server. The use license should also include a key that can be used to decrypt the DRM package. This
key should ideally be encrypted using the end user’s public key.
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12.3 Expressing the Use License – Rights Expression Languages
(RELs)
Rights expression languages (RELs) allow for the definition of the constraints, permissions etc. that
the rights holder gives to the user, and thus is used to express use-licenses. RELs are one of the
cornerstones of a DRM system and is seen as the main component that can be used to drive inter-
operability between different DRM systems [23].
The foundations of modern RELs were laid by Marc Stefik at Xerox Parc in the 1990s with Digital
Property Rights Language (DPRL) [13]. DPRL was subsequently developed into eXtended rights
Markup Language (XrML) by ContentGuard, a company founded by Microsoft and Xerox. Other
languages like Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL) and Creative Commons (CC) have arisen to
create open rights language specifications. Most modern RELs, like XrML and ODRL, are expressed
in XML, using XML Schemas to define the syntax and grammar of the language; enabling portability
across operating systems and platforms.
In the XrML 2.0 specifications [3], the requirements of a REL are given as:
• Comprehensive: A language that shall be capable of expressing simple and complex rights in
any stage in a workflow, lifecycle or business model.
• Generic: A language shall be capable of describing rights for any type of digital content or
service (an ebook, a file system, a video or a piece of software)
• Precise: a language shall communicate precise meaning to all players in the system.
Many of the criticisms of DRM systems stem from the current inability of RELs to express all the
legal rights expected by the consumer [16, 4]. Felten has argued that some legal rights like fair use
of copyrighted material, can never be expressed using RELs [16]. In [11] Bechtold countered that,
while RELs cannot express fair use cases in general; they can do so in individual cases. However, as
Mulligan et al. in [18] pointed out, current RELs do not have any syntax or grammatical capabilities
to express communication between the end user and the rights holder. This limits the usage of RELs
for contract negotiations, and thus current specifications of XrML, ODRL and other RELs are not
comprehensive.
12.3.1 Feature Requirements for a REL
In addition to the requirements of a REL as discussed above and in [3], there are key features that
should be provided by a REL. Below we list these features:
1. Negotiation Support: As discussed in section 12.2.1, it is very useful to have negotiation
language the same as the REL. No current REL standard offer these constructs.
2. License Templates: As discussed in section 12.2.2, there is a need for rights holders to describe
the terms they are willing to offer to the end user. ODRL does have an “offer” syntax, but we
are not sure if the mechanisms offered in the current ODRL specifications allow the full range
of requirements for license templates.
3. Extensibility: It is impossible to predetermine all the terms that could be used to express an
use license. Thus it would be useful to allow mechanisms to add further terms to the base REL.
Both XrML and ODRL have this feature.
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12.3.2 The REL
Presently, the extended XrML and ODRL discussed in [8] are the only RELs we know of that support
bi-directional communication. Furthermore ODRL is currently the only ODRL to have an “offer”
construct. Thus for these reasons, an extended ODRL with bi-direction support is probably the most
complete REL available in terms of the features we desire from a REL.
12.4 Transfer of Rights
The transfer of rights is not only a crucial cornerstone of many fair uses in copyright law, but also
useful in other applications, but, currently no DRM system supports transfer of rights.
Transfer of rights allow users to pass the rights to access and use DRM protecetd data to another user
temporarily or permanently. This could be a user selling their right to another person, or it could
be a user lending their access rights to a friend or family. In corporate environments, this feature is
particularly important – for example, when a person leaves the employment of a corporation, their
access to protected data must not only be removed, but should also be transfered to another person.
The main problem obstacle to transfer of rights in a digital environment, is that unlike the physical
world, creating perfect digital replicas of the object in question is easy. Thus even if the right is
transfered permanently, the user would most likely retain copies of the “originals”.
12.4.1 Permanent Transfer of Rights
Permanent tranfer of rights is relatively simple to handle if done through a third party. The idea is
simple – the third party, the license server, issues a new license to the new users with the current
terms and conditions, and invalidates the original license, using the revocation list. Thus, once the
original license has been revoked, the first user can no longer access the DRM protected work. For
this to work however, it must be assumed that all users update their revocation lists regularly.
12.4.2 Temporary Transfer of Rights
Unlike permanent transfer of rights, in a temporary transfer of rights, the use license cannot be
permanently invalidated. Thus after the lending period has passed, the rights must revert back to the
original user. Thus if the revocation list is maintained on a daily basis, this would work quite well.
12.5 Scenario Analysis
Scenarios 1 and 3 do not really need negotiations support, and thus the use of templates is not that
important. However, bi-directional support is still required – in scenario 1, a lecturer may want more
time to review the paper for example. Scenario 2 does require the use of templates and negotiation
support. Since negotiations can be used to support fair use in DRM, there is a high chance that a
negotiations system will be utilised.
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13 Payment Gateway
The Payment Gateway represents a service that can process payments. We do not intend specifying
how such a service is implemented, rather just a protocol that would allow the user to pay various Web
Services for services rendered without requiring the Web Services themselves to process the transaction.
The accounting for the services however need to be handled by the Web Services themselves. This
system would also potentially allow for any type of online payment service including Paypal, credit
cards and even debit cards.
To ensure privacy, the Payment Gateway does not require to know the details of what is being paid
for – just how much is being paid. Similarly, the Web Service does not require to know how the user is
paying for the services, just that the service was purchased successfully. Common payment gateways
could be very useful for general Web Services, as small businesses could pool together for a common
payment gateway that can handle multiple payment mechanisms.
13.1 Invoices
Web Services should create an invoice for the user after a user purchases a service. The details of the
invoice can be left to the Web Services themselves, but must contain an invoice identifier (from an
UNI), the ammount, the identifier of the service and the identifier of the user. Invoices must have a
digital signature to maintain integrity. A XML schema is shown in figure 26.
Figure 26: XML schema for an Invoice
13.2 Receipts
The user uses the invoice’s identifier to make a payment. The mandatory details detailed above are
required by the payment gateway. After a successful transaction, the payment gateway creates two
receipts – one for the user and one for the service. The receipt must contain the identifier of the user,
the amount paid, the identifier of the service that the payment is for, the identifier of the payment
gateway, the identifier of the invoice (to reconcile an invoice and the payment) and the identifier of
the receipt. The receipt must be signed to maintain integrity. A XML schema is shown in figure 27.
13.3 Scenario Analysis
The payment gateway is required only for scenario 2 and provides an easy interface for the users to
prove that they have paid for their music. The concept of a payment gateway is also useful to the
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Figure 27: XML schema for a Receipt
vendors – a number of different services can make use of one payment gateway for their financial
transactions. Thus the payment gateway can potentially have a larger role to play in the broader
e-commerce landscape.
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14 Requirement Analysis
In section 1.2, we outlined the requirements of a DRM system. In this section, we examine if these
requirements are addressed in our system.
1. Persistent protection: As in current DRM systems, protection is provided through the use
of encryption. The separation of the use license and the data allows for any manner of
distribution; and we believe that the requirements of persistent protection has been met.
2. Portability: Four types of portability were discussed in seciotn 1.2:
(a) Space Shifting: Because there is a separation of the use license and the data, space
shifting is easier to achieve. However, implementations could chose to restrict this,
by tying down the machines that could be used to access the protected data in the
use license.
(b) Time Shifting: Depends on the restrictions of the use license, but there is no restric-
tions in the framework to time shifting.
(c) Format Shifting: Because the DRM controller can be at an operating system or
hardware level, it can allow programs that promote format shifting to operate, as
long as the use license grants this permission.
(d) Platform Shifting: The design of the system is geared towards portability between
different operating systems and platforms. As long as two systems have compatible
DRM controllers9, the user should be able to access the DRM package.
3. Integration with existing applications: If the DRM controller is implemented at an operat-
ing system or hardware level, the application would not even know that the file is protected.
However, some complex protections would probably require application level support.
4. Excerpting: If the DRM controller is implemented at an operating system or hardware level,
and the use license allows excerpting, any application that allows excerpting can be used
to excerpt.
5. Transfer of Rights: In section 12.4, we detailed mechanisms that can be used to transfer
rights. Independent transfer of rights without the use of a TTP is however not solved.
6. Allow for changes to access and usage rights after distribution: The separation of the
data and the use license allows for the changes in license terms.
7. Privacy vs. Usage Tracking: User privacy does depend on the use licenses, but our system
can operate in an oﬄine environment (as long as the use license allows it). The use of
receipt and invoice tokens also allow for privacy of data between the various services – the
license server does not need to know the user’s credit card details and the payment gateway
does not need to know about the user’s buying habits.
If the use license requires an online connected environment, this can be accommodated.
However the exact user actions when they are accessing the data are not necessarily moni-
tored10.
8. Oﬄine Usage: Oﬄine usage is catered for as long as the use license allows it. Some online
connectivity is required however to get the use license.
9Compatibility depends on whether the DRM controller can interpret and execute the restrictions. For example, a
DRM controller for a DVD player is unlikely to be compatible with a e-book reader. Compatibility could also depend
on auxiliary services, for example authentication to a Novell Netware account may not be implemented by all DRM
systems.
10This would depend on the DRM controller implementation
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9. Easy identification: The UNI provides easy identification for all the players and objects in the
system. Furthermore, the numbering scheme also allows for non-UNI generated globally
unique identifiers.
10. Easy Verification: Verification and integrity is provided through the use of digital signatures
on all documents and tokens. The use of signed receipt tokens also allow the user to prove
their legitimate access as required by Bartolini et al. in [10].
11. Correctly collect revenue for right holders: The payment gateway allows users to pay for
their services. The distribution of the collected payments depnds on the payment gateway.
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15 Scenario Analysis
In section 2, we presented three scenarios where the DRM system can be utilised. In this section, we
review how the system addresses the needs presented in the scenarios.
15.1 Scenario A: Exam Papers
The DRM system in this scenario needed to handle different authentication systems. The full time
lecturers and the teaching assistant would most likely use the authentication system used to access
university computer facilities, while the printers, the part time lecturers and the external examiner
would not necessarily have such accounts. This is supported in our system.
The terms of the use license need to be limiting, and maybe even make use of short term licenses that
expire after a day or even few hours. The UNI server is best deployed at the university level, but the
service producer and the license server can be deployed at departmental levels.
15.2 Scenario B: Selling Music
The DRM system in this scenario requires to handle portability and fair uses. The license server in
our system meets these requirements – negotiation of use license terms allow for end user to request
fair uses, as well as preventing misuse of fair use. The use of a payment gateway allows for revenue
collection, and can be integrated with an online store quite easily.
15.3 Scenario C: Patient Data in a Hospital Group
The main challenge in this scenario is to protect patient data from irregular access, but at the same
time allow access to the data during emergencies. Thus authentication is the most crucial element in
this system. While biometrics would be a solution, this is impractical in a medical emergency. But, a
token based system is still the most secure authentication system that could be used.
Many people aleady make use of physical tokens for emergency purposes – bracelets that have the
wearer’s blood type and allergies for example. This could be extended to be used in a DRM system,
though having a codeword engraved on a bracelet is definitely insecure. Usage of mobile TPMs could
solve this problem, and could be the ideal solution. However, all token based approaches have the
same problem – the patient must have the token near him/her for it to be effective. Ultimately, the use
of DNA based biometrics is probably the most secure approach, but the priavcy questions associated
with such approaches have yet to be solved.
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16 Conclusion
In this document, we have laid out the specifications of a componentised DRM system. We have
detailed the components that would make up a complete DRM system, how these components interact
as well as how they satisfy the requirements for a generalised DRM system. We have also detailed
three different scenarios discussing how our systems can help solve the problem.
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